The New Indulgences — On the Moral Hypocrisy of German Parentage Law

How German law declares biological paternity sacred — then quietly sells exemptions for a clinic fee. And what reform would actually look like if anyone had the nerve to do it.

Consider two women. Both in their mid-thirties, educated, with a clear and deliberate wish for a child without a permanent partner. Both approach the same man. Both become pregnant. The child is biologically identical. The mother's intent is identical. The child's needs — its development, its future, its claim on care — are identical.

And yet German law treats them in fundamentally different ways. One paid a sperm bank. The other did not. That single difference — a payment receipt — determines whether the child has a legal father with a maintenance obligation or not. Not biology. Not intent. The payment method.

That is called a legal system. I call it selling indulgences.

The Principle That Isn't One

German Abstammungsrecht — the body of law governing legal parentage — rests formally on a clear premise: biological paternity is constitutive. Whoever fathers a child becomes the father. From paternity follows family relationship (§ 1592 of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, the German Civil Code), from family relationship follows maintenance obligation (§ 1601 BGB), and this chain cannot be broken by private agreement — the child's maintenance claim belongs to the child, not the parents, and cannot be waived in advance (§ 1614 BGB).

That is principled. That is consistent. It deserves respect, as long as it is applied consistently.

It is not applied consistently.

Germany's Federal Court of Justice ruled on 23 September 2015 (BGH XII ZR 99/14) that a man who consents to artificial insemination of his partner with donor sperm assumes paternity-equivalent responsibility — and with it, a maintenance obligation. All prior agreements are void against the child. The claim belongs to the child, not the adults who made arrangements above its head.

For a private donor who gave sperm in a cup at home with no agreement to parenthood at all, the outcome is the same in practice: paternity can be established by court order under § 1592 No. 3 BGB. No agreement can block this, because § 1614 BGB renders any such waiver unenforceable. If the mother or, later, the child brings a paternity claim, the donor is liable — regardless of what was agreed, and the legal avenue remains open without a statute of limitations.

So far, consistent.

The Institutional Buyout Window

Now the same sperm. The same man. The same woman. The same intent. Only the biological material is transferred not in a bedroom or bathroom but through a licensed fertility clinic — registered under Germany's Samenspenderregistergesetz (SaRegG), the sperm donor register act that came into force on 1 July 2018.

Suddenly the iron principle no longer applies. The donor is not a legal father. He owes no maintenance. The institutional intermediary has severed the biological paternity — which is exactly the same paternity — from its legal consequences. The statutory basis is § 1600d Abs. 4 BGB: court-ordered paternity establishment is explicitly excluded for donors at licensed fertility clinics. The same provision does not exist for private donors.

Why? Not because a better argument was found. Because an institutional firewall was constructed to prevent the unwanted consequence of the law's own stated principle. That is not a legal doctrine. That is an emergency exit.

The parallel to the medieval sale of indulgences is structurally precise, not merely rhetorical. The Church proclaimed that sin was constitutive, guilt inalienable — then sold exemptions from exactly that principle for money, calling them not exceptions but theology. German paternity law proclaims that biological fatherhood is constitutive, descent inalienable — then severs paternity for a clinic fee, calling it not an exception but a legal system. The difference: the Church was at least honest about the transactional nature of the arrangement. The modern legislator pretends the clinic exception belongs to an entirely different moral category, as though the channel — fertility clinic instead of bedroom — changes the ethical substance.

It does not. This is not an accidental contradiction. This is categorical fraud.

What the System Was Actually Built For

The reproductive medicine framework with its institutional firewall was not designed for single women who want children. It was designed for heterosexual married couples dealing with male infertility. Conservative legislators could accept that, because the output is a classical family structure: social father, mother, child. Orderly. Bourgeois. Photographable.

That the same institutional logic then applies to the exact opposite case — a woman who deliberately and autonomously wants a child and explicitly does not want a classical family — was either never thought through or quietly suppressed. Neither is a defence.

The result is a system that structurally offers the clearest legal path to the women who can afford a fertility clinic. The clinic creates legal certainty. A private arrangement creates legal risk — at the expense of the man who wanted to help, and indirectly at the expense of the child, whose maintenance situation depends on whether the mother had the money for a medical appointment.

The Reform Debate the Political Majority Avoided

In 2019, Germany's Federal Ministry of Justice published a partial discussion draft for reform of parentage law (BMJ, 12 March 2019). It named exactly this contradiction. The question was posed directly: should intentional parenthood be codified as an independent legal category? Could a documented pre-conception agreement not to be a parent constitute a legally relevant fact?

The answer from the political majority was silence. Not because the legal question was unanswerable — a government working group on parentage reform had produced workable proposals in 2017 (BMJ, Abschlussbericht Arbeitskreis Abstammungsrecht, 2017), and Justice Minister Buschmann had draft legislation ready in 2024. But because CDU/CSU and successive grand coalitions flinched from the consequences: a principled reform around intentional parenthood would inevitably force Germany to also revisit surrogacy, same-sex parentage, and the legal definition of motherhood. The entire parentage framework would need to be opened up.

So the man who kindly volunteered to help was left in the rain. And they called it child welfare.

What Karlsruhe Already Knows — and Berlin Still Ignores

While the legislature has stalled, courts have acted. The Berlin Court of Appeal (Kammergericht) referred the current parentage law to Germany's Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), concluding that the unequal treatment of children born to same-sex female couples compared to children born to opposite-sex couples was likely unconstitutional. The Celle Court of Appeal referred a separate paternity-at-donation case. Multiple proceedings are pending before the Constitutional Court.

These cases centre primarily on the discrimination faced by same-sex female couples — not on the private-donation scenario that is the core of this piece. A ruling from Karlsruhe would not automatically resolve all the contradictions described here. But it would force the parentage framework open as a site of reform, destroying the political alibi that the issue can wait. For CDU/CSU politicians who speak of an "established legal system" that should not be overturned "without necessity" — that necessity is now announcing itself, in writing, on Federal Court letterhead.

Voting against reform, or simply not scheduling it, is not a vote for the status quo. It is a vote for an unelected court to set the terms — with tighter deadlines, less room for policy design, and no ability to package the trade-offs between child protection, intentionality, and state support into a coherent whole. That is not a conservative position. That is an abdication of legislative responsibility.

The Counter-Argument — and Why It Doesn't Hold

It would be dishonest not to take the conservative position seriously. It runs as follows: biological paternity as a legal category protects children. Maintenance rights, inheritance rights, the constitutional right to knowledge of one's origins under Article 6 of the Basic Law — all of these hang on the assignment of a legal father. If parenthood becomes dissolvable by intent, children risk falling through the gaps between adult arrangements.

That is a real argument. It deserves a real answer.

First: the existing system already protects children selectively — depending on whether their mother chose the clinic route. The child of the clinic mother has no legal father and therefore no maintenance claim against the donor. The child of the private-arrangement mother has one. The law's protective function is already not universal — it applies only where no money changed hands at a clinic. Anyone using child protection as an argument against reform needs to explain why protection depends on the payment method.

Second: a reform based on intentional parenthood need not leave children unprotected. Notarially certified pre-conception agreements can explicitly address maintenance, inheritance, and the child's right to know its origins. State subsidiary support can fill gaps. The objection targets a badly designed reform, not the reform idea itself. And a well-designed reform is precisely what the legislature has owed since the 2017 working group report.

Two Honest Positions. One Must Be Chosen.

There are exactly two principally coherent answers to this debate. Both are defensible. Neither is what we currently have.

Position A — Biology is everything

Biological paternity is constitutive. Maintenance follows from descent, not intent. Whoever conceives is liable. If this position is held consistently: clinics receive no special treatment, every donation creates establis­hable paternity, and the result is de facto the end of licensed sperm donation in Germany. That would be the end of something useful. But it would be honest.

Position B — Intent is constitutive

A parent is someone who chooses to be one. Descent is biological. Parenthood is social and intentional. If this position is held consistently:

• A notarially certified pre-conception agreement excludes legal paternity — with explicit provision for the child's maintenance, inheritance rights, and right to know its origins
• Applies equally to private arrangements and clinic donations — no channel privilege
• The state covers the early years (ages 0–8, up to three children) as a subsidiary social investment, not a welfare payment
• Indexed, degressive from the fourth child, adjusted annually: this is fiscal policy mechanics, not a reform project
• No recourse against the biological contributor — the state is a co-investor in the demographic future, not a silent partner in a private arrangement

This would be a legally demanding reform — but an achievable one. And it is financeable.

The Demographic Argument Nobody Says Out Loud

Highly educated women have fewer children on average than women without university degrees — data from Germany's Federal Statistical Office on cohort fertility confirm this consistently.^[1] The absence of a legal framework for autonomous single parenthood is not the only factor — housing costs, childcare shortages, and career structure all play a role. But it is the factor the legislature can most directly change, and the only one for which political responsibility clearly rests with the Bundestag.

The calculation usually doesn't work out — not because the woman doesn't want a child, but because the law offers no viable path that doesn't require either a willing partner or a clinic visit.

A Bertelsmann Foundation study by Prof. Martin Werding (Ruhr University Bochum) calculated that an average child pays approximately €50,500 more into Germany's social insurance and tax system over its lifetime than it receives in state education and childcare support. Into the pension system alone, the net contribution per child exceeds €77,000 above what the child will ever draw in retirement benefits.^[2] These figures date from 2014 — the real values are higher today. Children are not a private indulgence. Their pension contributions fund all of us. It is time to translate that honestly into law.

Yes, there are free-rider risks. Couples could construct an arrangement to access state benefits. But the child exists anyway, the demographic effect occurs anyway, and the state pays the same amount — only bundled and visible rather than dispersed across child benefit, parental allowance, childcare subsidies, and advance maintenance payments. Those who call this abuse should explain why child benefit for a fifth child from a married couple is not.

Who Decided What — Inaction Has Names

The failure of reform has specific authors. "Political will was lacking" is not an explanation. It is a protective formulation for people who made decisions. Those decisions can be reconstructed.

Act I: The Bundesrat, 2021

In March 2021, the states of Berlin, Hamburg, and Thuringia introduced a resolution in the Bundesrat — Germany's upper house, composed of state government representatives — calling for reform of parentage law, equal treatment for same-sex mothers, and an end to the mandatory adoption requirement. The bill went to committee.

Germany's Bundesrat is not a deliberative chamber in the Westminster sense. Its committees are composed of state-level ministers. The Rechtsausschuss (legal affairs committee) recommended rejection. The Innenausschuss (interior affairs committee) recommended rejection. Neither is an anonymous institution. Confirmed members in 2021: the legal committee included Georg Eisenreich (CSU), Bavaria's Justice Minister. The interior committee included Joachim Herrmann (CSU/Bavaria), Thomas Strobl (CDU/Baden-Württemberg), Herbert Reul (CDU/North Rhine-Westphalia), Peter Beuth (CDU/Hesse), Roland Wöller (CDU/Saxony), Michael Zieschang (CDU/Saxony-Anhalt), Hans-Joachim Grote (CDU/Schleswig-Holstein). That is not a committee. That is a list of names.

On 7 May 2021 the resolution was pulled from the agenda — the session was chaired by Bundesrat President Reiner Haseloff (CDU, Saxony-Anhalt). On 17 September 2021 it came to a vote — again under Haseloff's chairmanship. Result: the initiative did not achieve the required absolute majority of 35 of the Bundesrat's 69 votes. Rejected.

The arithmetic is transparent even without an individual vote record — the Bundesrat does not routinely publish per-state votes on ordinary resolutions. The three proposing states (Berlin 4, Hamburg 3, Thuringia 4) plus all clearly progressive-governed states (Bremen 3, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 3, Rhineland-Palatinate 4) reach a maximum of around 21 votes in the most optimistic count. 35 were needed. The gap of 14 could only be closed from CDU/CSU-governed states — Bavaria (6), NRW (6), Hesse (5), Saxony (4), Saxony-Anhalt (4), Schleswig-Holstein (4), Saarland (3), together holding 32 votes. Had three of them voted yes, the majority would have been reached. None did.

The reform did not fail because of an anonymous collective. It failed because CDU/CSU justice and interior ministers voted it down in committee, and because CDU/CSU-led state governments cast their votes accordingly. These are people with names, offices, and accountability to voters.

Act II: The Buschmann Draft, 2024

Justice Minister Marco Buschmann (FDP) produced complete draft legislation in 2024 covering parentage law, child custody, and maintenance (BMJ, Eckpunktepapier Abstammungsrecht, January 2024). The parentage component was uncontested between the relevant ministries. Then the cabinet pre-clearance process intervened.

Lisa Paus (Greens), Federal Family Minister, blocked the start of formal inter-ministerial consultation on the overall package. Her objection concerned the maintenance component, not parentage law: under Buschmann's proposed maintenance rules, some mothers could receive less support. That is a legitimate policy disagreement on a genuinely difficult trade-off. The consequence, however, was that parentage reform was taken down as collateral damage, despite Paus's own ministry having explicitly welcomed it. A party that counts rainbow families as core constituency blocked reform for rainbow families inside its own cabinet office. That deserves a footnote in Greens history.

The second decision-maker was Christian Lindner (FDP), who collapsed the coalition on 6 November 2024. Completed draft legislation became discussion documents — overnight, without a word changed.

Act III: The FDP Bill — Seven Weeks, No Vote

On 17 December 2024, the FDP parliamentary group introduced Bundestag Bill 20/14263. Seven weeks remained until the 23 February 2025 election. The SPD and Greens did not schedule it for a vote.

The obvious justification is parliamentary normalcy: a majority controls the agenda, that is standing orders, not a political failure. This is formally correct. But standing orders are not a law of nature. They are a tool. The parliamentary group leaders Rolf Mützenich (SPD), Katharina Dröge and Britta Haßelmann (Greens) had the majority needed to put the bill on the agenda. They chose not to use it. In a representative democracy, parliamentarians are not executors of procedure — they are decision-makers who can apply procedure or not. A politician elected to represent constituents who then invokes standing orders to avoid a vote has made a political decision. They simply didn't call it one.

Act IV: 2025 — The Coalition Agreement as Headstone

The 2025 coalition agreement between CDU/CSU and SPD contains no provision on parentage law reform (cf. p. 62). Friedrich Merz (CDU) and Lars Klingbeil (SPD) co-authored that agreement. Justice Minister Stefanie Hubig (SPD) said in July 2025 that she could personally imagine a reform. The coalition agreement she co-signed contains nothing of the sort. That is not a position. That is a press release.

The Rhetoric: Quotes That Refute Themselves

CSU politician Dorothee Hierl told dpa in July 2025 — in the context of a discussion about co-motherhood for same-sex couples:

"A complete decoupling of descent from biology cannot be the solution."
— Dorothee Hierl (CSU), dpa, July 2025

She then added immediately that for anonymous sperm donation, precisely this decoupling was a perfectly sensible solution. The principle holds — except when the institutional sperm bank is involved. An explanation for why the channel changes the principle is still outstanding.

CDU/CSU legal affairs spokesperson Elisabeth Winkelmeier-Becker said in 2019, on the publication of the working group report, that the proposals would be "intensively reviewed" — the "Christian conception of humanity" being the decisive standard. The outcome of that intensive review is the 2025 coalition agreement: no change.

CSU deputy parliamentary leader Andrea Lindholz warned in 2024:

"An established legal system is being turned upside down in favour of individual adults' desire for personalisation, without necessity and without a societal majority."
— Andrea Lindholz (CSU), 2024

That several appellate courts have since referred that same system to the Constitutional Court as likely unconstitutional appears not to affect her assessment of the "necessity."

The Greens have consistently framed parentage law as an equality issue for rainbow families — legitimately, importantly, but incompletely. The self-determined, heterosexual, highly-educated woman in her mid-thirties who wants a child does not appear in that framing. The SPD has demanded parentage reform in every election manifesto in recent years and signed the opposite in every coalition agreement. The far-right AfD said nothing on parentage law in its 2025 manifesto. The BSW is silent.

Of Germany's seven parliamentary parties, one (FDP) identified the right instrument and failed to deliver it. One (CDU/CSU) upholds a principle it breaks itself — in the Bundesrat with a vote record, in the coalition agreement with a signature, in committee with a list of names. Two (SPD, Greens) want reform, but only for their own constituencies and only when there is no coalition cost. Two (AfD, BSW) do not exist in this debate. This is the political landscape in which this reform has been waiting since the 2017 working group report.

What Reform Would Actually Take

Yes, the reform is legally demanding. Parentage law touches fundamental rights, child protection, and constitutional positions. That is real — and it is not an argument against reform. It is an argument for careful reform. Complexity is a task for lawyers. It is not an excuse for politicians. The draft legislation was complete and on the table in 2024. What was missing was not technical competence. What was missing was the political will to sign something uncomfortable.

First: parentage law must codify the option of documented intentional non-parenthood — for both sexes, for all routes to conception, without channel dependency. Notarially certified, pre-conception, with a cooling-off period, and with explicit provision for the child's rights to maintenance, inheritance, and knowledge of its origins.

Second: the state advance maintenance payment (Unterhaltsvorschuss) becomes a genuine social benefit — no debt, no stigma, no recourse claim for the first eight years of life for up to three children. Tax allowances are adjusted, indexed, done. That is not a legislative project; it is a spreadsheet.

Third: the sperm bank loses its privilege. It is not a morally superior route to conception. It is a medical service provider. Those who are serious about the principle of biological paternity cannot simultaneously switch it off for paying customers.

The demographic problem has been known for decades. The need for parentage law reform has been known since at least the 2017 working group report under then-Justice Minister Heiko Maas. The solutions are known. What is missing is the politician who says: I will do this. I will explain it. I will stand behind it.

Until then, the law remains what it currently is: a compromise of convenience dressed up as a legal system. Morally no better than the indulgences Johann Tetzel sold in the fifteenth century. Just more expensive.

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Published: 20 March 2026
This is an opinion piece. It represents the author's views and does not constitute legal advice.

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Sources

Further legal sources: §§ 1592, 1601, 1614, 1600d Abs. 4 BGB (German Civil Code); BGH XII ZR 99/14 (23 Sept. 2015); BGH XII ZB 58/20 (16 June 2021); SaRegG (in force 1 July 2018); BMJ discussion draft on parentage law reform (12 March 2019); BMJ outline paper on parentage law reform (January 2024); Bundesrat BR-Drs. 223/21; Bundesrat 1008th session, TOP 54 (17 Sept. 2021); Bundestag Bill BT-Drucks. 20/14263; CDU/CSU/SPD Coalition Agreement 2025, p. 62.

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1. Cohort fertility by educational attainment: Statistisches Bundesamt (Destatis), Geburtentrends und Familiensituation in Deutschland, ongoing surveys. Women with university degrees show persistently lower average child numbers than women without. ↩︎

2. Werding, Martin: Familien in der gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung: Das Umlageverfahren auf dem Prüfstand [Families in Statutory Pension Insurance]. Bertelsmann Foundation, January 2014. The figures cited (€50,500 net surplus to the overall system, €77,000 to the pension fund) are calculated at 2014 price levels — real values are higher today due to wage and price growth. ↩︎